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EXPERTISE LOST 
An Early Case of Technology Assessment 
Social Studies of Science, 24 (1), 1994, 96-104 
 
Bernward Joerges 
 
 
In his beautiful book on the Eisenbahnreise, Wolfgang Schivelbusch mentions the expertise of a 
Königlich Bayrisches Obermedizinalkollegium on the health hazards of railway travel.1 This exper-
tise has played a certain role in the history of the railway and of technology more general. In this 
Note, I want to place it squarely in the yet-to-be-written history of technology assessment (TA).  
The Royal Bavarian medical expert report on the railways has been reproduced in various collec-
tions of historical sources2 and medical history books too.3 The first historian to refer to it, in the 
context of ridiculing southern German particularism, was none other then the great Prussian scholar 
Heinrich von Treitschke4.  
What did this early impact assessment claim and what was its impact? 
 
Delirium Furiosum 
 
The study's central claim, sometime around 1835, was that the railway is dangerous for your health 
and should be forbidden.  
"Locomotion with the help of any kind of steam engines should, in the interest of public health, 
be prohibited. The rapid movements cannot fail to produce in the passengers mental unrest, i.e. 
'delirium furiosum'. Even conceded that travellers voluntarily undergo this danger, the state must 
at least protect the onlookers, since the view of a locomotive, which races along in full speed, 
suffices to elicit this terrible sickness. It is therefore paramount that on both sides of the rails a 
fence is raised of at least six feet height."5 
                                                          
 
Paper written for the fifteenth anniversary of the FAST Programme, Commission of the European Community, 
Brussels, pre-print-version 
 
1 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, Geschichte der Eisenbahnreise (München: Hanser, 1977), 198. 
2 See, for example, Werner Pöls (Hg.) Deutsche Sozialgeschichte 1815-1970, Bd. 1 (München: C. H. Beck, 
1979); Wilhelm Treue and Karl H. Manegold, Quellen zur Geschichte der industriellen Revolution (Göttin-
gen: Muster-Schmidt, 1966); F. K: A. Schulze, Die ersten Deutschen Eisenbahnen Nürnberg-Fürth und 
Leipzig-Dresden (Leipzig: Voigtländers Quellenbücher Bd. I, 1st edn 1912, 2nd edn 1917). 
3 For example, see G. Koch and H. Hoffmann, 'Geschichte der Verkehrsmedizin für den Verkehr mit Land-
fahrzeugen von den Anfängen bis zum Ende des 2. Weltkriegs', Zentralblatt für Verkehrsmedizin, Vol. 15 
(1969), 129-59, 193-225. 
4 Heinrich von Treitschke, 'Unsere Aussichten', Preussische Jahrbücher, Vol. 44 (1889), 559-760; here. 582ff. 
5 Quoted from R. P. Sieferle, Fortschrittsfeinde? Opposition gegen Technik und Industrie von der Romantik 
bis zur Gegenwart (München: C. H. Beck, 1984), 88, who quotes after Pöls, op. cit. note 2, 371, who cites 
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The Obermedizinalkollegium took, in other words, a deeply sceptical view and advised whoever 
asked for their counsel to stop the infernal innovation of railways in the best interest of the public. A 
principled stand. But a kind of 'consenting adults' principle was allowed for too. In order to resolve 
the certain tension between the principles, the expertise suggests measures to protect the then major-
ity of passive onlookers by fencing in, and thus 'blackboxing' the inevitable. And that is indeed what 
happened if not always with fences six feet high, then by other insurmountable measures. What did 
not happen was the predicted 'delirium furiosum' from the early Trains à Grande Vitesse (TGVs), al-
though of course a great number of sicknesses whose outbreak happened to coincide with travelling 
the railway were attributed to this technology.6 
So far so good. One might say that nothing much has changed in TA's rhetoric since the early 
days. But there is more to it, in terms of understanding the art, science, and politics of TA to this day, 
and beyond. 
 
In Search of an Expertise 
 
As early as 1920, the historian Feldhaus expressed doubts about the authenticity of the said exper-
tise.7 Since then a great number of researches were undertaken in order to locate the study in the Ba-
varian archives, alas to no avail.8 The document was never found and the Nuremberg Archive of 
Transport finally decided, as reported by Sieferle9 that it never existed. But can we be satisfied with 
that? No, we can not because this early case of TA has, if we trouble to analyze it more carefully, too 
much in common with other cases of vanishing evidence provided by partial or impartial experts 
(which cases I will refrain from naming here). 
Let us begin by identifying the 'system actors' (meaning major interested parties). In this case: the 
TA professional, the historian of technology, and the new sociologist of technology. And let us hear 
what they have to say in turn. 
 
The Historian 
 
Generations of historians, both professional and amateur, followed von Treitschke, citing his citation 
of the ominous source. A well-known amateur, for instance, remarked: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Schulze, op. cit. note 2, 24, who does not give a source. All historical sources quoted here are from Sieferle, 
op. cit. 
6 See Koch & Hoffmann, op. cit. note 3, for data on such things as the 'railway-spine', the 'railway-brain', 'pa-
ralysis of the nervus facialis' from chasing a train and so on. 
7 Franz M. Feldhaus, Der Laie als Erfinder. Eine soziale Skizze (Berlin, 1920) 
8 See, for example, C. Nörrenberg, 'Die Sage vom delirium furiosum - eine Sage', Jan Wellem, Vol. 5 (1930); 
M. Beckh, Deutschlands erste Eisenbahn Nürnberg-Fürth (Nürnberg: 1935);W. K. Mück, Deutschlands er-
ste Eisenbahn mit Dampfkraft: Die kgl.priv. Ludwigsbahn zwischen Nürnberg und Fürth (Fürth:, 1968); Sie-
ferle, op. cit. note 5. 
9 Sieferle, op. cit. note 5, 88. 
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"All the anxieties of the eminent agencies of that time did not, as is well known, come true later: 
the travellers in the trains of the new 'steam horses' did not get vertigo, the onlookers did not be-
come sick, and the wooden fences which were to make the new installations invisible, were 
abandoned - only the wooden fences blocking the foreheads of all these 'Experts' have still re-
mained with us..."10 
But many entirely respectable historians have made use of this expertise, mostly in a context of show-
ing that early fears of technology turn out to be unwarranted once the technology comes to be mas-
tered and culturally assimilated. 
In all these cases the authority of the argument was established by quoting a historical document 
as quoted by preceding, presumably more authoritative historians. Truth lies in sources. And the 
proof of a source is its credible citation. And the strength of a proof increases with the number of al-
lies an author can recruit into his, or her, citation cartel.11 
Other historians concluded from the absence of an original source that it never existed. The logic 
is the same here: factual truth lies in the source. No source, no facts. And since the study does not ex-
ist, its alleged evidence can be discounted. 
Of course it is not that simple. There must be other corroboration, and there was. First of all, the 
expertise survived in the literature in two slightly differently worded versions.12 This has led to the 
hypothesis that the expertise might have been written in Latin and has survived in tow different trans-
lations. Sieferle pursues this trail but finds that at the time medical opinions were not written in Latin 
anymore. He allows himself the footnote speculation, however, that 'one could presume vaguely that 
this 'expertise' was invented in France or so and affected to be Bavarian. Sometime in the 19th cen-
tury it was then believed to the authentic and translated into German. But there are no concrete indi-
cations' (Sieferle 1984:270). 
In the end, Sieferle, and presumably most historians of technology nowadays, tend to follow an-
other source, namely the 1985 Festschrift in celebration of the Bavarian railway anniversary where 
indeed initial warnings against health risks are recalled, coming, however, not from a Obermedizi-
nalkollegium but from a 'second class healer', a barber raging against the railway: 'He was of the opin-
ion that the steam and the speed would cause illnesses: even people who did not travel but only saw 
the train pass by could be caught by vertigo'.13 There may have been a source, but if there was, it was 
not reputable, and being not reputable accounts for the dubiousness of the opinion. 
A sophisticated way out: the rhetoric of truth/source/quote is preserved effacing the source, mak-
ing it into a non-source. The non-source's factual claims can safely be put aside, not so much because 
                                                          
10 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (München: 1st edn 1925), 233. 
11 For the politics of scientific truth see especially Latour, for example, Bruno Latour, 'The Politics of Explana-
tion', in Steve Woolgar (ed.), Knowledge and Reflexivity (London: 1988), 155-77 and idem, Les Microbes, 
Paix et Guerre (Paris 1984). 
12 The second version is quoted in Treue and Manegold, op. cit. note 2, 84, for example, who quote W. Strauß, 
Einst und jetzt auf Stephensons Spur (Hannover, 1925). 
13 Hagen, Die erste Deutsche Eisenbahn mit Dampfbetrieb zwischen Nürnberg und Fürth. Ein Beitrag zur Kul-
turgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts (Nürnberg: 1986). 
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retrospectively they turned out to be so much non-sense (that too) but because they never were prop-
erly conceived and documented, and published. 
 
The TA Expert 
 
In the historical disciplines, the custom for every historian is then to quote other, preferably more 
highly reputed ones, and that is that. And that is why the story could gather credibility over the dec-
ades by a string of citations into which very potent members of the profession were recruited and thus 
contributed to the strength of the case. The matter was blackboxed and could be referred to like the 
date of the year - until it became untenable when some young Turk historian cracked open the box. 
For the professional TA man (rarely a woman) things are a great deal trickier. He takes his clue 
from Hitler who, affirming the existence of the expertise and making sly use of established historical 
truth, proceeds to deride the experts. Sneering at expert competence and, yes, the dignity of impartial 
knowledge is a favourite strategy of those in power whenever expert advice is not welcome or an ex-
perts' private political stance is considered the wrong one.  
For any seasoned TA professional it is more than obvious that the alleged expertise never existed 
as such; but that it was a fabrication, faked by some party who was out to ruin the still young and vul-
nerable business of TA. The pretentious, pseudo-medical style ('delirium furiosum', put between quo-
tation marks at that), the crude 'have your cake and eat it too' style of political advice, the call for 
enormous public expenditures and other features of the concoction all too obviously betray the inten-
tion to jeopardise TA's claim to play a role in the exploitation of technical achievements. 
It cannot be denied that with few exceptions the historical profession has lent support to all this, 
not only by authenticating the fake from one decade to the next but by insidiously deriding the injec-
tion of competent know-how other than that coming under the concept of 'learning from history', a no-
tion that notoriously must fail in the face of technical innovation and social progress.14 
TA is not about analogies to historical precedents established by 20/20 hindsight, as practised by 
historians. TA is responsibly prospective, or rather prospectively responsible. Since its beginnings, 
TA has developed a set of techniques for enabling decision-makers to base their choices on sound 
empirical analysis and prognosis, paired with accumulated, if tacit, professional expertise and hands-
on know-how.15 If TA experts are sometimes said to be the means by which expert reports generate 
more expert reports, this must be seen as yet another move to discredit TA's contribution to the oiling 
of the common wheel, to coin a socio-technical metaphor. Had it not been for attacks on the profes-
sion's integrity as already exemplified by the fake railway expertise of 1835, TA would not be com-
pelled to resort to extensive, sometimes, it cannot be denied, over-extensive reporting. It is important 
to understand that TA's most accomplished practitioners prefer to communicate by way of privileged 
                                                          
14 This is of course a professional deformation not restricted to historians of technology. See, for example, R. 
Neustadt and E. May, Thinking in Time: the Uses of History for Decision Makers (1993). 
15 For variants of TA rhetoric see for instance contributions in Meinolf Dierkes, Thomas Petermann and Volker 
von Thienen (eds.), Technik und Parlament (Berlin: edition sigma, 1986). 
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counsel rather than published report. How else could factual accuracy, social responsibility and a cli-
ent's interests be balanced? 
 
The New Sociologist of Technology16 
 
Enters the sociologist of the new school. She (or he) requires us, first of all, to proceed symmetri-
cally.17 This means two things: to assume the same likelihood for health hazards as for the health 
benefits of railway travel18; and to assume equal likelihood for the existence of the expertise and for 
its non-existence. 
A word for the non-initiated must be added here. The new sociologist of technology cultivates 
mostly post-modern sensibilities. This means that she generally celebrates 'aporia' - ambiguity, anar-
chy, contradiction, difference, discontinuity, discord, disparity, indeterminacy, irony, paradox, per-
versity, obscurity, opacity, in a word: chaos.19 The new sociologist will therefore seek out the odds, 
the chance aspects, the manifold contingencies and, even more to the point, coincidences of the case. 
It is important to note, however, that many new sociologists do not strictly adhere to the symme-
try principle or, as we may now call it, the principle of double coincidence. They often privilege that 
horn of a dilemma which tends to be effaced by mainstream science and politics. For the present case 
that means to pay special attention to the possibilities that indeed railway travel may cause brain 
damage or other pests and that a genuine expertise did indeed exist.  
Methodologically the new sociologist of technology is a hermeneut. A hermeneut proceeds on 
the assumption that 'Wo Rauch ist, ist auch Feuer' (where there is smoke there is fire too). In other 
words, the basic hermeneutic suspicion20 leads us to assume that an original technology assessment 
of the risks of railway travel did once exist and that the fake (if one can, as a new sociologist, apply 
the concept of 'fakes' at all) lies in its attribution by modern historians to a figaro style quack. I would 
even go further here: the fact that the expertise could not be found until today proves (if one can use 
the concept of 'proof' as a new sociologist) that it really existed (to the extent that the concept of 'real-
ity' is useful here). 
The question arises why the expertise was suppressed. Here the new sociologist starts talking 
with the TA expert. She is much taken with the latter's hunch that the expertise must not have been in 
the interest of those who paid for it and that for this reason it never was properly archived. By the 
                                                          
16 See also Bernward Joerges, 'Romancing the Machine', International Studies of Management & Organization, 
Vol. 19, No, 4 (1990), 24-50. 
17 For a general notion of symmetry in science and technology research see the relevant contributions in Andrew 
Pickering (ed.) Science as Practice and Culture (Chicago, IL:The University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
18 Why not, indeed, a 'railway cure' for the victims of other forms of locomotion. 
19 I have taken this by no means exhaustive list (and alphabetised it myself) from Gertrude Himmelfarb's coura-
geous attack on post-modern history 'Telling it as you like it' in Times Literary Supplement No. 4672 (1992), 
15. 
20 For a theoretical treatment see Umberto Eco, The Limits of Interpretation (Bloomington, IN:, 1990), but also, 
for a more narrative exposition, idem, Foucault's Pendulum. 
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same token, the search should, according to this interpretation, be reopened, focusing on old table 
drawers and the like. 
It is entirely possible, however, knowing certain academic practises that have survived to this day 
in Bavaria, that the expertise has indeed been discovered by some doctoral student in the history of 
technology but was effaced for the second time, as it were, under the pressure of a Doktorvater who 
above all wanted to preserve the reputation of his discipline. In which case the chase might as well be 
called off because the expertise will probably have ended up in the shredder of some Bavarian ar-
chive. 
As to the issue of health risks, the new sociologist for once can rub shoulders with the men from 
TA. It is hard to dispute, and a matter of historical record, that railway travel has caused tremendous 
anxiety and damage in terms of health and lives.21 True, early calls to 'reduce risk (Wagniß)' in rail-
ways 'under all life circumstances to a minimum' in a Europe where 'general security' reigns22 have in 
the long run led to noteworthy improvements and deriskification of that particular technology. But 
this could not have happened without the antecedent health threat and, by the same token, early (and 
probably relatively cheap) TA studies. So right from the beginning, TA was less about the impacts of 
technology then the impacts on technology. 
 
A future for TA 
 
TA has come a long way. Its early, and as the case of the lost expertise shows, risky analyses of tech-
nological and environmental hazards, have developed into an art, a science, and a politics. Attempts 
to undermine its moral and intellectual integrity largely belong to the past (although one must always 
keep a vigilant eye on the historians). But there is room for improvement. 
The future (think of business in the next century) needs a poetics of TA. This means above all a 
healthy dose of irony and self-reflection. TA's general tendency to mimic scientific objectiveness 
looks by now a bit dated, to say the least. In order to bring TA safely into the next century, it would 
help, if its practitioners and ideologues realised that it is not only post-modern historians and new so-
ciologists of science, but old-European historians and TA experts as well who 'tell the story as they 
like it', as Professor Himmelfarb so succinctly put it. 
There can be little doubt today that conventional expertise in matters of technical progress has 
become somewhat obsolete. The scientistic convictions and rhetoric of TA have become shaky, and 
in this far more fundamental sense, the profession may rapidly be losing its expertise. It is time to un-
derstand that the most valuable expertise at the end of the millennium (and one which will in time 
find its lucrative markets, too) is a particular competence: to be able to demonstrate in non-aggressive 
                                                          
21 For the terrible accidents and loss of life see especially Max M. von Weber, Die Technik des Eisenbahnbe-
triebs in bezug auf die Sicherheit desselben (Leipzig, 1854); for an early assessment of environmental dam-
age see R. Hasenclever, 'Über die Beschädigung der Vegetation durch saure Gase', Chemische Industrie, Vol. 
2 (1879), 225-31, 275-80. 
22 Weber, op. cit. note 21, 7. 
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ways that, in any given case, the versions of reality advanced by its interested parties are, as they say, 
'socially constructed'.23 In TA terms this means: they are negotiable. 
Methodologically, the practise of constructionist TA (CTA) hinges on the strict observance of 
the aforementioned principle of double coincidence (PDC). 
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